

MR. VERZOLA. (Continuing)...following reasons. We have no access to the full documentation of the system - the technical manuals, the operating manuals, file descriptions, database descriptions, system descriptions. So far, we don't have access to these.

THE CHAIRPERSON. So far, Mr. Flores, would you care to give react to that and did you give that, I don't expect you to give it, you're bound by contract. Did you give it to COMELEC? And COMELEC, why did you not share to the public? They're may be good reasons.

MR. VERZOLA. Just access.

MR. FLORES. I think, those materials would have been available if the interested parties would have participated in the source code review.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Okay.

MR. VERZOLA. Just to...

THE CHAIRPERSON. Bettina, you wanted to say something?

MS. QUIMSON. Basically, I think what I was trying to get to before when I said I didn't see the whole process, they walk us through a process that they walked through, but the fact that of the matter is if they don't tell us from...though they showed us it's going from this machine to this machine, as I go back, I always say, where is the database going? Where is the data going? I want to see the exact flow of that data, okay? Because that makes a difference, you know. Yes, it's going to a machine but I need to know what is the security put in specific to this data when it talks to this data. As of now, please correct me if I'm wrong, Cesar, but you mentioned that the ID therefore, the digital signature specific to the iButton and the PCOS...excuse me, the CF Card, that's correct, right. So, there is nothing that shows which PCOS machine. Is there an audit trail to that? The PCOS machine that is transmitting. Are we...

MR. FLORES. It's in the logs.

MS. QUIMSON. It's in the logs. The specific PCOS machines.

MR. FLORES. Yes.

MS. QUIMSON. What exactly does it show in the log?

MR. FLORES. The ID number of every PCOS.

MS. QUIMSON. The ID number. So it's the digital signature of the PCOS machine.

MR. FLORES. No, no, no. As you know, there is a certificate with the keys that is inside the PCOS machine like in a memory in the mother board. In the CF card there is a similar certificate. Right? They produce the digital signature.

Now, in the CCS server, you know how the digital signature is generated. So, in the CCS server there is a similar certificate with a set of keys. When the digital signature does not match simply a result does not go into the CCS. Actually, we showed that yesterday in Congress when we alter with the CD and therefore, we manipulated, we destroy, change the digital signature of the data that was coming from one CCS server to the other one and therefore, it was rejected by the server. That is basically one of the handshakes that happens between one component and the other – the checking of the digital system. But the most important proof of all in the case of transmission and canvassing are the actual, the simplest...in an electronic voting system, you have to check basically that two things work – the count at the precinct and then the canvassing.

The canvassing is the simplest one to prove because you have 30 hard copies of the ERs and you have the servers. So, if you have a hard copy that doesn't match the server or in the website, you know something happened during transmission. So you have 76,000 precincts each one of which...each one should have 30 copies. We are talking about 2 million 200...2 million plus copies of ERs that can be checked against the canvassing. That is the easiest way to prove.

I understand that you want to see more, but the evidence is there. There's nothing more blatant than that.

MS. QUIMSON. One last...

THE CHAIRPERSON. Go ahead. Wait, no, no private conversations unless it's in Spanish. Go ahead, Bettina. Go ahead, Bettina and then after that, back to Verzola..

MS. QUIMSON. Yeah, I have a question. I would still like to see copy of the audit, please, when it sinks so that I can see where... because I didn't see that yesterday. You know, that will help clear up a lot of matters here. I think...

MR. FLORES. You want the log of the canvassing server?

MS. QUIMSON. Well, when the transmission takes effect...

MR. FLORES. Okay.

MS. QUIMSON. Okay? And how it reads that transmission as to belonging to that certain identity other than the BEIs and what not because it was not shown to us yesterday.

Second to that, how long does the transmission takes effect? Say, for example, today at one o'clock I am transmitting to the municipal or whatever that may be.

THE CHAIRPERSON. No, let's make it real. At 7:00 o'clock, it closes that 7:15. How long does it take?

MR. FLORES. Provided there is no signal, it might take two, three minutes.

MS. QUIMSON. Okay, two, three minutes.

MR. FLORES. Remember that first the machine has to handshake with the private network. And from there had to handshake with three different servers. So, this process takes about two, three minutes.

MS. QUIMSON. Two to three minutes, but when it logs on to the audit log, it says, I have transmitted...sunked already. Transmission complete. When it says that, that means it has transmitted, right?

MR. FLORES. Yes.

MS. QUIMSON. In other words, it has talked to each other.

MR. FLORES. Yes.

MS. QUIMSON. So, there should be no lag time. It should be the exact time.

MR. FLORES. Yeah.

MS. QUIMSON. Okay, thank you.

MR. RENATO DIAZ. (Former Representative, First District, Nueva Ecija).
Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRPERSON. I understand Congressman Diaz has something concrete instance failure of transmission. Please, then after that the lawyer of Mr. Emano because Mr. Emano's name has been dropped all over the place. I hope you are brief. And then after that Congressman Diaz.

Go ahead, Mr. Verzola. Again, I promise you no more interruption.

MR. VERZOLA. As I said, Mr. Chairman, even us who you consider experts, we are also still trying to understand the system itself up to this time because of the lack of access and because we have no full access to the PCOS machines themselves.

THE CHAIRPERSON. You have read now the summary of what was said to have been achieved in the Cabuyao visit. Do you agree with all of them?

MR. VERZOLA. No, sir.

THE CHAIRPERSON. No? Which ones don't you not agree with?

MR. VERZOLA. First on the question of the time it takes to copy. It's not just the copying file but I think this has already been mentioned earlier, the whole process of...

THE CHAIRPERSON. Yeah, I already mentioned that myself. It's not just a printing job with the computer but...

MR. VERZOLA. ...because that was just copying that you will looked at.

THE CHAIRPERSON. That's right.

MR. VERZOLA. We are talking about the whole process from the importation, actually from the placing of the purchase order down to the...

THE CHAIRPERSON. Okay, okay. We got that and I asked that already.

MR. VERZOLA. Maybe I should also ask the question if there was already a contingency measure that in case of problems like this, the regional offices or the provincial offices had to make the copies. Then how come that the copies were actually made from the Cabuyao...

THE CHAIRPERSON. Because I understand the answer is...

MR. VILLORENTE. That was only approved May 9 in the morning.

THE CHAIRPERSON. May 9 after the crisis already.

MR. VILLORENTE. Yes. We have been discussing this before, even before this configuration error was discovered. But Smartmatic's answer was they didn't have the right people in the field to be able to deploy such a system. That was where DOST came in.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Yes, they did not have right people in the field then. They would not have it after Director Tolentino sent out this directive, anyway. So, what was the purpose of a directive that in fact, have no people to implement it.

MR. VILLORENTE. Yes, Your Honor. That's the reason why DOST was requested to come in because we have provincial directors in place in all of the provinces and the protocol was the materials were sent to COMELEC's provincial election supervisor and then they have to...

THE CHAIRPERSON. So, when you asked Mr. Cesar Flores, "Can you adopt this contingency plan?" And he... why did you even asked him when you knew he did not have the people but you knew you had the people? Did you, at least, admit and tell him, "By the way we can implement this ourselves?"

MR. VILLORENTE. Well, we offered that, I don't know, sometime after this configuration error was discovered because...

THE CHAIRPERSON. Before that, you did not know the people that Mr. Cesar Flores did not have?

MR. VILLORENTE. No, well, we wanted them to do it.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Why?

MR. VILLORENTE. Well, it's their responsibility, Your Honor, to have...

THE CHAIRPERSON. It's their responsibility, but apparently, it's not. So, that's their interpretation.

MS. EVANGELINE J. CARRASCO. (Counsel of Representative Rolando "Klarex" A. Uy). Mr. Chair, could we ask the COMELEC if there was an *en banc* resolution regarding that contingency measure as the director...directive, Your Honor.

THE CHAIRPERSON. We will ask that tomorrow. Bettina, go ahead.

MS. QUIMSON. We are looking at the posting of what we are talking about right now with the DOST mandate. It says here in the Commission on Elections' website that the press release was posted on April 21, 2010 but it was actually signed May 5, 2010, but it was posted April 21.

THE CHAIRPERSON. What is this directive?

MS. QUIMSON. What we're discussing right now.

THE CHAIRPERSON. For giving the 20...?

MS. QUIMSON. Yes, sir.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Okay, so they aired the draft.

REP. RODRIGUEZ. In other words, COMELEC already knew and they have already a fear that there will be a failure? Because if it's April 20...so very much ahead

THE CHAIRPERSON. Ahh...in other words...in other words...

REP. RODRIGUEZ. In other words, there is really, Mr. Chairman, let me finish because I'm really concerned about this blank CF cards.

Does it mean, therefore...

(MS. ROSALIE P. GOMEZ TOOK OVER)